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I. INTRODUCTION
For over three decades, state supreme courts have wrestled with an
exponential increase in the frequency and size of punitive damage awards.'
Several state legislatures have also responded by reducing the unpredictability
of punitive awards by enacting laws that place outer bounds on their amount,
often tying them to a multiple of compensatory damages awarded to the
plaintiff. The United States Supreme Court, over this same period, has
incrementally recognized constitutional limitations on punitive damages based
both in procedural and substantive due process. 3 State courts are compelled to
follow these constitutional guidelines, which have gained grudging acceptance.
4
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,5 however, marks the first time that the
Supreme Court has had an opportunity to consider whether a punitive damage
award is excessive from a common law standpoint. 6 Unlike the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions on punitive damages, state courts are not bound
to follow the high court's ruling in Exxon. Will state courts view the decision as
solely limited to the field of federal maritime law, or will the high court's
powerful reasoning broadly influence state courts struggling to cabin in
"outlier" punitive damage verdicts?
Part II of this Article examines the common law methods state courts use to
determine whether a punitive damage award is excessive, including jury
instructions and appellate review. These highly subjective verbal thresholds,
1. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run Wild": Proposals for
Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1008-09 (1999) (citing John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 142
(1986); George L. Priest, Punitive Damages and Enterprise Liability, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 123, 123
(1982); Malcolm Wheeler, A Proposal for Further Common Law Development of the Use of
Punitive Damages in Modern Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REV. 919, 919 (1989))
(discussing the history of punitive damage awards).
2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a), (d) (LexisNexis 2005) (allowing the greater of 3:1 or
$1.5 million in most personal injury suits, and 3:1 or $500,000 in most other actions); ALASKA
STAT. § 09.17.020(0 (2008) (allowing the greater of 3:1 ratio or $500,000 in most actions); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (2008) (allowing only a ratio of 1:1); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 510.265(1)
(West Supp. 2008) (allowing the greater of 5:1 or $500,000 in most cases); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
03.2-11(4) (1996 & Supp. 2007) (allowing the greater of 2:1 or $250,000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2315.21(D)(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2005) (providing a 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages
in most tort cases); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (2007) (establishing a $350,000 punitive damages
cap).
3. See infra Part III.A.
4. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Selective Due Process: The United States Supreme Court
Has Said that Punitive Damages Awards Must Be Reviewed for Excessiveness, but Many Courts
Are Failing to Follow the Letter and Spirit of the Law, 82 OR. L. REV. 33, 35 (2003).
5. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
6. See id. at 2619.
[VOL. 60:881
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such as whether the award "shocks the conscience" of the court, provide little, if
any, predictable guidelines to persons who might be subject to such awards.
State courts routinely skip this common law analysis and move straight into a
constitutional review of the award, plunging into the matrix of complicated and
sometimes contradictory Supreme Court constitutional decisions.
For that reason, Part ll of this Article provides a brief review of the United
States Supreme Court's hesitant and gradual wading into the area of
constitutional punitive damage jurisprudence. The Article then examines the
Court's decision in Exxon, which contains some similarities to the Court's prior
constitutional reasoning but reaches its result on the basis of data, logic, and
careful reasoning rooted in common law. On these bases, the Court rejects
verbal thresholds as both unwise and ineffective. In spite of the hundreds of
decisions rendered by state supreme courts, none have zeroed in on the outlier
verdict like the Supreme Court does in Exxon.
Part IV of the Article demonstrates that state courts have followed pivotal
Supreme Court rulings as a matter of sound policy and legal reasoning, even
when they have no constitutional tether. For example, state courts have looked
for guidance to the Supreme Court in determining whether and when to admit
scientific and other expert evidence, how to interpret the language of state
constitutional or statutory language where there is a federal equivalent, and
whether to award pure emotional harm damages in asbestos cases where a
plaintiff has suffered no physical injury.
Part V of this Article concludes that Exxon provides a sound basis and a
clear guide for state courts to incorporate into their understanding and
development of common law. It has the potential to persuade state courts to
move away from traditional, subjective verbal thresholds, such as whether the
award shocks the conscience or arouses "passion and prejudice," and move
toward more precise empirical standards for evaluating whether punitive
damage awards are excessive. Exxon may ultimately prove even more
influential as persuasive guiding authority for state courts determining whether
an award is excessive under common law than the Court's constitutional
punitive damages jurisprudence.
11. STATE COMMON LAW STANDARDS OFFER AN INEFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO
OUTLIER AWARDS
Prior to the Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional limits on both the
procedure and substance of punitive damages awards, states primarily
7. See infra Part II.A.
2009]
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controlled excessive award amounts through common law standards. 8 As the
Exxon Court astutely observed, these state standards often failed to provide
meaningful criteria and promote consistency among awards.9 For this reason,
there is a growing trend for state courts to bypass the "superfluous verbiage" of
the common law in favor of a consideration of the constitutional factors which
must be met.'
0
Courts have used their common law authority to review punitive damages
verdicts for excessiveness since 1763, when England's high court, in Huckle v.
Money, II suggested that judges could review damages awards that "all mankind
at first blush" would find "outrageous."' 12 This common law authority carried
over to the American Colonies and, in the nineteenth century, developed in
many state courts to a review of damage awards for "partiality" or "passion and
prejudice."' 3 Similarly, many jurisdictions adopted a "shocks the conscience"
standard that still provides the verbal formulation of the common law standard
of review for punitive damages in many states today. 14 Pursuant to such
standards, courts employ the common law method of remittitur to reduce
punitive damages awards deemed excessive. 15
8. Some states expressly limited punitive damages by statute or prohibited their recovery.
See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507:16 (LexisNexis 1997) (prohibiting punitive damages absent
an express statutory provision); Flesner v. Technical Commc'ns Corp., 575 N.E.2d 1107, 1112
(Mass. 1991) (barring punitive damages absent express statutory authorization); Distinctive
Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (per curiam) (citing Miller v.
Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Neb. 1975); Abel v. Conover 10 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960))
(barring punitive damage awards in state); Fisher Props., Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 726 P.2d 8,
23 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (citing Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 635 P.2d 441, 443 (Wash. 1981),
amended by 649 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1982)) (barring punitive damages absent express statutory
authorization).
9. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2627.
10. See Allison L. Bussell, Comment, The Eclipse of State Common-Law Review and
Assessment of Punitive Damages By the Due Process Analysis: The Aftermath of BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 71 TENN. L. REv. 337, 359 (2004).
11. (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.).
12. Id. at 769; see also Richard W. Murphy, Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts, and
the Hard Look, 76 WASH. L. REv. 995, 1014 (2001) (citing Huckle and describing two "flavors" of
state judicial review for excessiveness).
13. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
14. See, e.g., Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 178-79 (Iowa 2004) (applying a "shock the
judicial conscience" standard); Baldwin v. McConnell, 643 S.E.2d 703, 708 (Va. 2007) (applying a
"shocks the conscience" standard for review of punitive damage awards).
15. See Bussell, supra note 10, at 340 ("Remittitur is the state common-law method by
which a court reviews and reduces excessive punitive damages awards .... Unlike constitutionally-
reduced verdicts, remittitur is a discretionary device and is reviewable under an abuse of discretion
standard." (footnote call numbers omitted) (citing Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d
1320, 1331 (11 th Cir. 1999); Murphy, supra note 12, at 1015)).
[VOL. 60:881
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Not surprisingly, the vague standards left in place by such terse language in
these common law checks on excessive punitive awards have prompted some
states to elaborate more meaningful criteria. For example, as the Court in Exxon
discussed, Maryland courts consider a nonexclusive list of nine common law
factors that include "'degree of heinousness,' 'the deterrence value of [the
award],' and '[w]hether [the punitive award] bears a reasonable relationship to
the compensatory damages awarded.' 16 Similarly, Alabama provides seven
factors, including the defendant's "profit from [the] misconduct," the
defendant's "financial position," the plaintiffs litigation costs, whether the
defendant "has been subject to criminal sanctions for similar conduct," and
"other civil actions" against the defendant "arising out of similar conduct." 17
Other states, such as Arkansas, also attempt to instill greater meaning in
their shocks the conscience standards, yet without enumerated criteria. Rather,
courts may separately consider "the extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent
of the party committing the wrong, all the circumstances, and the financial and
social condition and standing of the erring party."1
8
It remains unclear the extent to which such attempts to more precisely
define the standard of judicial review for punitive awards result in substantive
protections that are greater than the constitutional guidelines establishing the
outer level of due process rights with regard to punitive damage awards. In
other words, the question is whether common law standards functionally matter
if, in the end, the constitutional standard is the more exacting and, in effect, a
higher standard than the states' common law approaches. Indeed, several courts
have indirectly arrived at this conclusion.
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court, applying judicial review of a
punitive damage award under the state's common law standard, has found the
constitutional factors outlined b, the United States Supreme Court in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore "persuasive, but not dispositive, indicia of
whether a particular award is appropriate under Indiana common law.'2° The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a decision not
analyzing excessiveness on constitutional grounds, also recognized that Gore
"should assist... in the application of [the] standard, by which [a court]
16. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2627 (2008) (alterations in original)
(citing Bowden v. Caldor, Inc., 710 A.2d. 267, 277-84 (Md. 1998)).
17. Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb, 892 So. 2d 299, 317 (Ala. 2003) (applying Green Oil Co. v.
Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989); Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374,
1379 (Ala. 1986)).
18. Bank of Eureka Springs v. Evans, 109 S.W.3d 672, 683 (Ark. 2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Ellis v. Price, 990 S.W.2d 543, 548 (Ark. 1999)).
19. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
20. Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 446-47 (Ind. 2003) (citing Stroud v. Lints, 760 N.E.2d
1176, 1180 & n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).
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deem[s] excessive a punitive damage award that 'shocks [the] judicial
conscience."' 21 The Oregon Supreme Court has gone further, finding that,
except where expressly authorized by statute, a challenge to a punitive damages
award may only be made on constitutional grounds.22 States such as these have
effectively federalized punitive damages review.
23
The Supreme Court in Exxon similarly recognized this ineffectiveness of
common law standards for review of punitive damages and the trend towards
bypassing the common law analysis in favor of constitutional guidelines. The
Court remained appropriately "skeptical" that courts can and should rely on the
verbal formulations that comprise the common law standards of states to protect
individuals from excessive awards.
24
HI. THE SUPREME COURT'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES JURISPRUDENCE
Exxon is the latest in a series of Supreme Court cases on punitive damages,
yet it is unique in falling outside the realm of constitutional jurisprudence.
A. Brief Review of the Supreme Court's Constitutional Punitive Damages
Jurisprudence
As Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recognized, "As little as
30 years ago, punitive damages were 'rarely assessed' and usually 'small in
amount. '2By the late 1970s and early 1980s, "unprecedented numbers of
21. Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's
Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1988)).
22. Parrott v. Carr Chevrolet, Inc., 17 P.3d 473, 483 (Or. 2001); see also OR. REV. STAT.
§ 31.730(2) (2007) ("If an award of punitive damages is made by a jury, the court shall review the
award to determine whether the award is within the range of damages that a rational juror would be
entitled to award based on the record as a whole, viewing the statutory and common-law factors
that allow an award of punitive damages for the specific type of claim at issue in the proceeding.").
23. See also Frank A. Perrecone & Lisa R. Fabiano, The Federalization of Punitive
Damages and the Effect on Illinois Law, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 537, 549-52 (2007) (discussing
Illinois's response to Supreme Court punitive damages decisions and subsequent state cases
applying federal guideposts).
24. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2628 (2008); see also Bussell, supra
note 10, at 359 ("Gore and its progeny have impeded significantly states' rights to determine what
factors juries should consider in awarding punitive damages as well as juries' consideration of
those factors. It now appears that juries' assessments of punitive damages awards and the state law
empowering them to do so are vestigial factors in the punitive damages process ...." (citing
Daniel Van Horn, Restraining Punitive Damages: State Farm Decision Clarifies the Court's
Efforts at Reform, TENN. B.J., Dec. 2003, at 18, 38-40)).
25. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 500-01 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1982)); see also RICHARD L. BLATr ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A STATE
[VOL. 60:881
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punitive awards in product liability and other mass tort situations began to
surface,",26 and the size of punitive damage awards "increased dramatically.,,
27
Since then, the Supreme Court has increasingly placed legal controls on
both the amount of and procedures for reaching punitive damage awards,
emphasizing its concern that excessive awards may infringe upon fundamental
principles of due process. 28 These legal controls include procedural due process
requirements to guard against arbitrary awards and provide for meaningful
judicial review,29 substantive due process restrictions on the amount of punitive
awards, 30 and Commerce Clause limitations on a state court's ability to consider
activity outside its jurisdiction as a basis for punitive awards.
31
The Supreme Court, however, entered the world of punitive damages with
great hesitancy in part because of a view on the part of at least some members
of the Court that determinations as to excessiveness are within the sound
discretion of state court judges applying the tools available under traditional
common law and not a matter of federal constitutional concern. In the Court's
first foray into the excessiveness of punitive damages in Browning-Ferris
Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,32 it found punitive damages in private
civil actions were "too far afield from the concerns that animate the Eighth
Amendment" and therefore held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to punitive damages. 33 The Court declined to
address the issue of whether the award was excessive under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the parties had not raised it
BY STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:4, at 5 (2008-2009 ed.) ("[G]enerally before 1955,
even if punitive damages were awarded, the size of the punitive damage award in relation to the
compensatory damage award was relatively small, as even nominal punitive damages were
considered to be punishment in and of themselves.").
26. Jeffries, supra note 1; see also Philip Borowsky & Jay Nicolaisen, Punitive Damages in
California: The Integrity of Jury Verdicts, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 147, 148 (1983) (noting trend of
"juries... award[ing] substantial punitive damages with increasing frequency" (citing Victor B.
Levit, Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 1980 INS. L.J. 257, 259)).
27. Priest, supra note 1.
28. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (holding that a
multi-million dollar punitive damages award against a cigarette manufacturer for injuries inflicted
to nonparties violated constitutional procedural due process).
29. See id. at 352-53; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416
(2003); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1994); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991).
30. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424, 433-34 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod.
Corp., 509 U.S. at 453-56; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18-19.
31. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 571-73.
32. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
33. Id. at 275-76.
2009]
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before either the district court or the court of appeals below. 34 Nevertheless, in
dicta, the Court invited the defendants to bring the issue before the Court again,
noting that "[t]here is some authority in [the Court's] opinions for the view that
the Due Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages
award," but "[tihat inquiry must await another day."
35
That day came two years later in 1991, when the Court recognized in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip that punitive damages awards had
"run wild" in this country and are subject to constitutional due process
limitations. 36 Finding that the award did not violate due process, the Court
rooted its decision in the adequacy of procedural protections. " For
constitutional purposes, it found that the instructions given to the jury, the post-
trial review procedures, and the appellate review procedures "impos[ed] a
sufficiently definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion [of the jury to
award] punitive damages." 38
In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,39 a plurality of the
Supreme Court moved into the realm of substantive due process limits on
punitive damages.4° In this case the Court again found that the award did not
exceed constitutional boundaries. 4' The Court also declined to adopt a bright-
42line test for making such a determination.
The Supreme Court returned to consider the procedural issue of whether a
state must provide judicial review of the amount of a punitive damages award in
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.43 The Court held that states must allow for judicial
review of the size of unitive damages awards, and Oregon's failure to do so
violated due process. Although the Court's decision centered on procedural
issues, the Court took the opportunity to reiterate that punitive damages awards
that are so large as to be "grossly excessive" are unconstitutional.45
34. Id. at 277.
35. Id. at 276-77.
36. 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. at 19-24.
38. Id. at 19-22.
39. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
40. Id. at 453-54 ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not go."' (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907))).
41. Id. at 462.
42. See id. at 458 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
43. 512 U.S. 415,420 (1994).
44. Id. at 432.
45. Id. at 420 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at
456) ("Our recent cases have recognized that the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the
size of punitive damages awards." (citing TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. 433; Haslip, 499 U.S. 1)).
[VOL. 60:881
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In 1996, the Court returned to the open question in TXO to provide
guidance on how to determine whether the size of a punitive damage award falls
outside the limits of due process. 46 In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, an
Alabama jury returned a $4 million verdict, an amount the Alabama Supreme
47Court reduced to $2 million. In that case, the plaintiff, who purchased a new
BMW sedan, experienced $4,000 in compensatory damages related to the
unauthorized repainting of his car during detailing by the distributor. 48
Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided that the $2 million award still left a
punishment that exceeded Alabama's legitimate interests in protecting the rights
of its citizens because the award relied on out-of-state conduct; therefore, the
award was unconstitutionally excessive. 49 The Court's decision also provided
three "guideposts" for determining whether a punitive damages award is
"unconstitutionally excessive." 50 These guideposts include the "degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct"; 51 the ratio of actual damages to
punitive damages; 52 and a comparison to "civil or criminal penalties that could
be imposed for comparable misconduct." 53 These guideposts serve both to
"prohibit[] a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a
tortfeasor ' 54 and ensure that "a person receive[s] fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the
penalty that a State may impose."' 5 In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group Inc.,56 the Supreme Court clarified that courts must consider all
three Gore factors when reviewing a punitive damages award for excessiveness
57and do so through de novo review.15
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, where a
jury awarded a $145 million punitive damage award stemming from bad faith,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims based on State
Farm's initial refusal to settle a case, the Court essentially put "meat" on the due
46. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996).
47. See id. at 566-67.
48. Id. at 563-65. The jury apparently calculated the $4 million punitive damage award by
multiplying the plaintiff's damage estimate ($4,000) by 1,000, the number of cars BMW allegedly
sold throughout the country under its nondisclosure policy. See id.
49. See id. at 585-86.
50. See id. at 575-85.
51. Id. at 575 (citing David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems,
and Reform, 39 ViLE. L. REv. 363, 387 (1994)).
52. Id. at 580.
53. Id. at 583.
54. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)).
55. Id. at 574.
56. 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
57. See id. at 440 & n.14 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 574-75).
58. 538 U.S. 408 (2002).
2009]
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process "bones" outlined in the Gore factors. 59 First, the Court reminded lower
courts that the "most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive
damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct."
60
The Court indicated that trial courts must instruct juries that they "may not use
evidence of out-of-state conduct to punish a defendant for action that was lawful
in the jurisdiction where it occurred." 61 The Court also stated that juries may not
calculate punitive damages based upon the hypothetical claims of other
claimants because "[plunishment on these bases creates the possibility of
multiple punitive damages awards for the same conduct; for in the usual case
nonparties are not bound by the judgment some other plaintiff obtains."
62
Most importantly, however, in leading up to Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
63
Campbell closely considered, from a constitutional standpoint, the permissible
ratio between compensatory and punitive damages awards. 64 The Court declined
once again to create a "bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed" but indicated that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process." The Court noted that in exceptional cases a higher ratio may be
justified where "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount
of economic damages." 66 The Court, however, observed that "[w]hen
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee." 6 The Court also reminded lower courts that the "wealth of a
defendant cannot justify an otherwise unconstitutional punitive damages
award.,
68
Finally, in its most recent pre-Exxon punitive damages decision, the
Supreme Court ruled in Philip Morris USA v. Williams that juries can consider
59. See id. at 418-28.
60. Id. at 419 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575).
61. Id. at 422 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 572-73).
62. Id. at 423 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 593 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
63. 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
64. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424-28.
65. Id. at 425.
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). We have posed a
hypothetical where somebody throws harmful acid at another person intending serious physical
injury but causes only minimal damage to that person's clothing. In such a case, punitive damages
substantially exceeding actual damages may be justified. See Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform--State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge
Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1365, 1379 & n.86
(1993).
67. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425.
68. Id. at 427 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 585).
69. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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harm to others in assessing the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, but
courts must adequately instruct the jury that it cannot punish the defendant
specifically for harm done to others.
Throughout this line of cases, two members of the Court, Justices Scalia
and Thomas, have refused to join the majority view that the Constitution
provides substantive protections against excessive awards. In TXO they
expressed their disagreement with the Court's recognition of a "so-called
'substantive due process' right that punitive damages be reasonable., 72 Justice
Scalia has stated that "the Constitution gives federal courts no business in this
area, except to assure that due process (i.e., traditional procedure) has been
observed." 7 3 Rather, Justice Scalia has noted that state courts have ample
authority to address any perceived "'unfairness"' in punitive dama es through
the common law "and have frequently exercised that authority." In Exxon,
however, Justices Scalia and Thomas, while reiterating their view against
constitutional substantive limits on the size of punitive damages awards, joined
in the Court's analysis from a common law standpoint.75
B. Courts Have Struggled with Evaluating Excessive Punitive Damage
Awards Through a Constitutional Lens
Despite the dearth of meaningful standards in state common law approaches
to review of punitive damage awards, the United States Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence has not always served as a model of clariV6. State
courts have sometimes struggled in applying the high court's standards. Three
examples include the Court's instructions regarding consideration of conduct
involving individuals other than those before the court, the comparison between
the punitive damage award and the potential civil and criminal penalties
provided by statute for the conduct at issue, and the application of the Gore-
factor approach generally.
The Court's recent distinction in Philip Morris USA v. Williams,77 which
allows a jury to consider a defendant's bad conduct toward those other than the
70. Id. at 356-57.
71. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
72. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 472 (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). However, Justices Scalia and Thomas have supported the Court's rulings on
procedural due process as a means to guard against arbitrary awards. See id. at 471.
74. Id. at 472 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 39).
75. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 (2008) (Scalia, J., joined by
Thomas, J., concurring).
76. See Schwartz et al., supra note 4.
77. 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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individuals before the court for the purpose of determining the level of
reprehensibility but not directly in awarding damages, is one that is likely to
result in significant confusion. 78 Justice Stevens commented in dissent that
"[tihis nuance eludes me. When a jury increases a punitive damages award
because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the),ury is by definition punishing the defendant-directly-for third-
party harm." 9 Likewise, as Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed:
Trial judges are likely to struggle for years with formulating jury
instructions that simultaneously tell the jury to consider and not
consider harm to people other than the plaintiffs. Appellate courts are
left with little guidance on when the size of a punitive damages award
is appropriate and when it is unconstitutional. Juries can consider harm
to others in determining reprehensibility, but they cannot base punitive
damages on harm to others. How can an appeals court possibly
determine whether a punitive damages award violates this command? 80
Courts have also found application of the third Gore factor, comparison of
the punitive damage award to the "civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct," 81 particularly challenging. Many
appellate courts have simply disregarded this guidepost. 82 Others haveoutwardly defied its application, finding available penalties too low to compare
78. Id. at 356-57; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Robert J. Nelson, Class Action
Treatment of Punitive Damages Issues After Philip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get Therefrom
Here, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 407, 407-08 (2008) (calling the pronouncement either a "profound
paradox" or "ill-considered distinction"); Steven Moulds, Note, Who's On First?: Why Philip
Morris USA v. Williams Left Juries Confused About Whose Injuries Can Be Considered when
Determining Punitive Damages, 59 MERCER L. REv. 1043, 1059 (2008) (noting that "juries now
have one more constraint placed upon them when considering punitive damages" and suggesting
that this constraint will be difficult for juries to understand).
79. Philip Morris USA, 549 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Erwin Chemerinsky, More Questions About Punitive Damages, TRIAL, May 2007, at 72,
72; see also Michael P. Allen, Of Remedy, Juries, and State Regulation of Punitive Damages: The
Significance of Philip Morris v. Williams, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343, 359 (2008) ("I have
read this passage scores of times. I have also taught it to hundreds of students in Remedies courses
so far.... How can the jury consider conduct toward others to determine reprehensibility but not
to punish the defendant?").
81. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996).
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2000)
(discussing the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages but not making any reference to the third Gore factor); Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d
1001, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 1997) (analyzing the first and second Gore factors but making no mention
of factor three); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Goodman, 789 So. 2d 166, 182 (Ala. 2000) (stating that
the court had "no basis for considering [the third Gore] factor relevant").
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to a punitive damages award83 or simply declaring that there are no comparable
penalties. 84 Perhaps courts find that comparing punitive damages to available
regulatory or criminal penalties for the conduct at issue is, at least in some
cases, like comparing apples and oranges.
The third Gore factor is not the only one that certain cases gloss over.
Although the Supreme Court has "instructed" lower courts to consider all threef I 85
of its factors, some have performed only a cursory analysis. For example, in
Williams v. Aetna Finance Co.,86 a consumer fraud case in which a jury
awarded the plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory damages and $1.5 million in
punitive damages, the Supreme Court of Ohio cryptically stated that "it would
appear that when one of the guideposts is particularly relevant, a lesser reliance
on the other guideposts may be justified."
In addition, there are many still-developing areas of constitutional punitive
damages jurisprudence, such as the consideration of the defendant's out-of-state
conduct, N imposition of punitive damages multiple times for the same or
83. For instance, even the Alabama Supreme Court, on remand in Gore, reconsidered the
punitive damages verdict against defendant BMW in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in that case. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 509 (Ala. 1997). The
state high court considered the first two factors given by the Supreme Court and found that the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the large ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages indicated that the award was excessive. Id. at 512-14. Turning to the third factor,
however, the Alabama Supreme Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had instructed it
to accord "substantial deference" to legislative judgments regarding the appropriate penalty in
similar cases, but it then proceeded to completely disregard the Court's direction. Id. at 514
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 605). The Alabama Supreme Court
stated that the maximum civil penalty under Alabama law would be $2,000 and then declared that
because the statutory penalty was set "at such a low level, there is little basis for comparing it with
any meaningful punitive damages award." Id. Alabama courts have echoed this sentiment in other
cases as well. For example, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Robbins, 719 So. 2d 245 (Ala. Civ. App.
1998), the court again found that the statutory penalty for misfiling a prescription was too low to
merit comparison to the punitive damages awarded in that case. Id. at 247.
84. For example, a Mississippi court awarded two former employees $10,000 and $35,102,
respectively, and $1.5 million each in punitive damages after they were fired for reporting forged
checks. Paracelsus Health Care Corp. v. Willard, 754 So. 2d 437, 440 (Miss. 1999). The
Mississippi Supreme Court summarily concluded that "there are no other sanctions which would
be imposed under the facts of this case." Id. at 445.
85. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001).
86. 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998).
87. Id. at 859-60, 871.
88. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
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similar conduct, 89 use of controversial procedures such as "reverse
bifurcation," 9 and the role of wealth in properly arriving at an award. 9'
State courts, however, retain the ability to develop and apply their own
common law standards to effectively address outlier verdicts within this
constitutional framework. The Supreme Court's decision in Exxon may provide
a starting point for doing so.
C. Considering Punitive Damages from a Common Law Perspective
Exxon opens a new chapter in the Supreme Court's punitive damages
jurisprudence. By considering punitive damages from the vantage point of the
common law, the Court acted with a different purpose than it would when
making a constitutional determination. The Constitution of the United States
sets the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct. These boundaries are
necessarily imprecise, requiring lower courts to struggle to determine on which
side of the due process line individual cases fall. On the other hand, common
law is directed at lesser thresholds that develop based on the legal reasoning of
the courts in creating a fair and just judicial system. It is capable of providing
greater precision than constitutional law.
Thus, in Exxon the Court did not base its determination of excessiveness on
the constitutional due process guideposts expressed in Gore and expanded upon
in Campbell92 or the procedural requirements of Haslip, Oberg, or Cooper
89. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1091-92 (D. Alaska 2004) (noting
Exxon's exposure to "a multiplicity of claims" that were not all before the court and describing the
"very real risk that two punitive damages awards in different courts, but based upon the same
incident, could result in a doubling up on deterrence and punishment").
90. See State ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 655 S.E.2d 161, 167 (W. Va. 2007), cert.
denied sub nom., Chemtall Inc. v. Stem, 128 S. Ct. 1748 (2008); see also Victor E. Schwartz &
Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a "Reverse
Bifurcation" Approach to Punitive Damages, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 375, 376 (2008) (describing
the "rare, harsh penalty" of reverse bifurcation).
91. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 427 ("The wealth of a defendant cannot justify an otherwise
unconstitutional punitive damage award." (citing BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585
(1996))).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 58-68. The Court's analysis, however, did consider
each of the due process factors from a policy standpoint, including the reprehensibility of the
conduct (recklessness, not malice), Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631-33 (2008),
the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages (noting a 1:1 ratio is the upper limit
Campbell suggested for unexceptional cases with substantial compensatory damages), id. at 2634
(citing Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425), and civil and criminal penalties for comparable conduct (noting
that the Clean Water Act provides for criminal fines of up to $25,000 per day for negligent
violations of pollution restrictions and up to $50,000 per day for knowing violations), id. (citing 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(B), (2)(B) (2006)).
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Industries;93 instead, it conducted its review under federal maritime jurisdiction
as a "common law court of last review, faced with a perceived defect in a
common law remedy."94 As the Court explained in a message that appears to
embrace state common law jurisprudence, its review of the punitive damages
"considers not their intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of
regulating them as a common law remedy for which responsibility lies with this
Court as a source of judge-made law in the absence of statute. ' 5 While not
binding on state courts, the reasoning of the Court may prove influential in
determining whether an award is excessive before reaching the outer limits of
what the Constitution permits.
The case stems from the well-known grounding of the Exxon Valdez
supertanker on Bligh Reef off the Alaskan coast in 1989, in which the ship's
hull ripped open, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into the Prince
William Sound. 96 The tanker's captain, Joseph Hazelwood, had a history of
severe alcohol abuse during his employment with Exxon that was known to his
superiors. 97 Before leaving port the night of the accident, "Hazelwood downed
at least five double vodkas.., enough 'that a nonalcoholic would have passed
out."' 98 Before a required turn, Hazelwood, the only officer licensed to
complete the maneuver, left the bridge and put the ship on autopilot. 99 The crew
failed to make the turn, leading to the catastrophic result that ruined the
livelihoods of commercial fishermen and native Alaskans and devastated the
region's wildlife. 10 At the time of the accident, Hazelwood had at least three
times the legal limit of alcohol in his bloodstream for driving in most states.
10 1
Exxon ultimately faced a class action of approximately 32,000 fishermen,
property owners, and other private parties who sought punitive damages,
leading to a $5 billion punitive damage award against Exxon in addition to a
total of $507.5 million in compensatory damages.
After the Ninth Circuit reduced the punitive damage award to $2.5
billion, 10 3 Exxon expectedly went up to the Supreme Court. On June 25, 2008,
the high court addressed whether the multi-billion dollar punitive damage award
was excessive from a very different perspective than its previous constitutional
93. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38, 43-45, 56-57.
94. See Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626, 2629.
95. Id. at 2626-27.
96. See id. at 2612-13.
97. Id. at 2612.
98. Id. (quoting In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001)).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2612-13.
101. Id.
102. See In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1050, 1058-63 (D. Alaska 2002).
103. See In re Exxon Valdez, 472 F.3d at 625.
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decisions. The case came to the Court under maritime law, one of the limited
areas where federal courts exercise common law decision making. 104 In essence,
the Supreme Court acted as if it were a state supreme court rather than as a court
examining federal constitutional questions.
In order to place the $5 billion punitive damage award in perspective, the
Court found it important to consider the complete picture of the costs Exxon
faced in the aftermath of the disaster. 105 Exxon spent approximately $2.1 billion
on cleanup efforts. 106 The company also paid $100 million in restitution and a
$25 million fine for criminal violations of the Clean Water Act, the Refuse Act,
and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.107 Exxon paid at least $900 million toward
restoring natural resources to settle a civil action brought by the federal
government and the State of Alaska as well as another $303 million in voluntary
settlements with fishermen, property owners, and other private parties.
Finally, in the case that came before the Court, Exxon faced a huge class action
of fishermen, property owners, and other private parties seeking punitive
damages. 109 The jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood
and $5 billion against Exxon. 't In addition, Exxon paid a total of $507.5
million in compensatory damages."' On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reduced the
punitive damage award with respect to Exxon to $2.5 billion.1 2 After dividing
on the issue of a corporation's liability for punitive damages stemming from the
acts of reckless employees and finding that the Clean Water Act's penalties did
not preempt maritime common law on punitive damages, the Supreme Court
considered whether the already-reduced $2.5 billion punitive damage award
remained excessive under maritime law. "
3
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, went to the core issue, which he
deemed "[t]he real problem" of "the stark unpredictability of punitive awards"
104. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2619; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (providing that the federal
judicial power shall extend to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction"); see also Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 543 U.S. 14, 23 (2004) ("Our authority to make decisional law for the
interpretation of maritime contracts stems from the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
federal courts."); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
("[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal
common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of
the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or
our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." (footnote call numbers omitted)).





110. Id. at 2614.
111. Id. at 2634.
112. Id. at2614.
113. Id. at 2615-19.
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and "outlier" verdicts. n4 The Court closely examined empirical studies on
punitive damage awards, finding a troubling range of almost complete
unpredictability." 5 This led the Court to question whether the judicial system is
treating defendants that engage in similar conduct in a fair and consistent
manner. 16 While "by most accounts" the Court found that "the median ratio of
punitive to compensatory awards [is] less than 1:1,"l17 a comprehensive study
of punitive damages in state civil trials found a "mean ratio of 2.90:1 and a
standard deviation of 13.81." 118 Justice Souter stated that even those
"unsophisticated in statistics" can see that "the spread is great, and the outlier
cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding
compensatories." 19 Bench trials showed a narrower distribution, but they still
exhibited a level of variability and unpredictability that concerned the Court. 120
The Court suggested that such a range might be acceptable if rationally based
on the facts of the cases, but it noted that "anecdotal evidence suggests that
nothing of that sort is going on." 121 Justice Souter gave a telling example
flowing from one of the Court's constitutional cases, Gore, where an Alabama
jury awarded $4 million in punitive damages and a second Alabama jury, in a
strikingly similar case, awarded no punitive damages at all. 122 Both cases
involved cars that were repainted without the owner's knowledge. 23 Justice
Souter observed that the Supreme Court was "[a]ware of no scholarly work
pointing to consistency across punitive awards in cases involving similar claims
and circumstances." 124
The Court found problems with current approaches state courts used to
125avoid or correct excessive, or "outlier," punitive damage awards. It expressed
skepticism with the effectiveness of verbal thresholds-the practice of trial
courts avoiding unpredictable outliers by instructing the jury that punitive
114. Id. at 2625.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2625-26.
117. Id. at 2624.
118. Id. at 2625 (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 263, 269 tbl.1 (2006) (reporting median ratios of 0.62:1 in jury trials
and 0.66:1 in bench trials)).
119. Id. at2625.
120. See id. (citing Eisenberg et al., supra note 118) (noting a "remarkable" distribution
among punitive damages assessed by judges with a mean ratio of 1.60:1 and a standard deviation
of 4.54).
121. Id. at 2625-26 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 565 n.8 (1996)).
122. See id. at 2626.
123. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 565; Yates v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 642 So. 2d 937, 938 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1993).
124. Exxon, 128 S. Ct. at 2626.
125. See id. at 2628.
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damages are to deter, but not bankrupt or destroy, a defendant and should be
proportionate to the wrongfulness of the conduct. 126 The Court observed that
"[i]nstructions can go just so far in promoting systemic consistency when
awards are not tied to specifically proven items of damage.' ' 127 Likewise, the
Court found that traditional post verdict and appellate standards, such as the
shocks the conscience standard or passion and prejudice test, even with the
enumeration of more specific factors, had not yielded consistent awards.' 28 The
Court's comprehensive review of cases and data supported its bottom line:
words alone, no matter how carefully crafted, are an ineffective safety net
against both arbitrary and excessive damage awards.'2 9
In a search for a better way, the Court looked to its experience in the realm
of criminal sentencing, where it found quantified limits necessary to rein in
"relatively unguided discretion." 130 As it searched for better approaches to
outlier punitive damage verdicts, the Court showed a careful balance in
considering the interests of plaintiffs and defendants. 131 For that reason, it
rejected a universal hard cap, like the maximum term of imprisonment in a
criminal case, because there is no standard universal tort injury.' 32 In addition, a
hard cap would not provide an index to inflation.' 33 On the other hand, the
Court found a ratio based on the median of punitive damage awards much more
promising.134 For that reason, the Court established a 1:1 ratio-slightly above
the median supported by empirical study-as an upper limit for punitive
damages in ordinary cases falling under maritime law. 35 Further, the Court
made clear that the common law opens the door to higher awards in some
circumstances, such as when the defendant's conduct is intentional or malicious,
driven by a desire for gain, or unlikely to be discovered.136 Likewise, a higher
award may be permissible when a plaintiff experiences only modest economic
harm. 37
The Court considered but found inappropriate the adoption of a higher ratio
as a judicial standard, such as the 3:1 ratio codified by a slim majority of state
legislatures that have adopted a ratio to restrain punitive damages. Higher
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2627-28.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 2628.
131. See id. at 2628-29.
132. See id. at 2629.
133. See id.




138. Id. at 2631-32.
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ratios may provide an acceptable outer bound when dealing with exceptionally
malicious conduct, but the Court found them not suitable in ordinary cases.
Treble damage provisions, such as those contained in some state consumer
protection acts, adopt a higher ratio for a different public policy reason: to
provide an incentive to bring a claim when the plaintiffs economic harm is
likely to be low or, in the case of antitrust actions, to supplement government
enforcement by inducing private litigation. '40 These justifications, the Court
found, are inapplicable in cases involving significant compensatory damages. 141
In another message of importance to state judges who shape individual
states' common law, the Court rejected the dissenting view of Justices Stevens
and Ginsberg 142 that the Court should leave the issue of control of outlier
punitive damage awards to the legislature. 43 Justice Souter, speaking for the
majority, stated that, "it is hard to see how the judiciary can wash its hands of a
problem it created, simply by calling quantified standards legislative."' 144 The
same can be said of the judiciary in state common law courts.
The Exxon Court based its analysis in common law principles, informed by
empirical data, and rooted it in the belief that penalties such as punitive
damages must contain a degree of consistency and predictability. As the Court
noted in reaching its determination that a 1:1 ratio is appropriate in most cases:
[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that
even Justice Holmes's "bad man" can look ahead with some ability to
know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.
And when the bad man's counterparts turn up from time to time, the
penalty scheme they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability
of suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage.
45
Moreover, the Court recognized: "History certainly is no support for the
notion that judges cannot use numbers."' 46 For instance, the Court noted, "[t]he
139. Id. at 2631.
140. See id. at 2632.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 2630 & n.21.
143. See id. at 2634-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2639-
40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Breyer also dissented from the
portion of the Court's opinion finding punitive damages excessive because he found that the facts
of the case supported a level of egregiousness sufficient to provide an exception to the general 1: 1
ratio. See id. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
144. Id. at 2630.
145. See id. at 2627 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 459 (1897)).
146. See id. at 2630
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21-year period in the rule against perpetuities was a judicial innovation." 
147
Likewise, limitation periods for civil actions are judge-made law, with some
time constraints borrowed from statutes but others deriving from wholly judicial
balancing and determination. 148 Therefore, the Court's establishment of a 1:1
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages has clear common law
precedents.
The Court expressed its belief that the 1:1 ratio, while furthering
predictability for defendants and the civil justice system generally, will not
harm or be unfair to plaintiffs. 149 As the Court made clear, today's punitive
damages are not compensatory in nature.' Thus, plaintiffs will continue to
receive full compensation and, under the Court's ratio, will, in cases involving
more than negligence but less than malicious conduct, have an opportunity to
receive up to double the monetary value of their economic harm. Moreover, a
1:1 limit on punitive damages also furthers the interests of plaintiffs in two
respects. First, it avoids the situation where one or more massive early punitive
damage verdicts bankrupt a business, leaving little or no resources to
compensate plaintiffs who experienced similar injury at the hands of the same
defendant.' 5' Second, it avoids a rush to the courthouse to throw the dice at
being the first to obtain an extraordinarily high punitive damage award.
Exxon provides state court judges with an opportunity to reconsider their
application of common law standards for determining whether punitive damage
awards are excessive. Judges have set and modified the standards for the award
of punitive damages' 52 with occasional legislative intervention. 53 Courts have
147. Id. (citing Cadell v. Palmer, (1833) 6 Eng. Rep. 956, 963 (H.L.)).
148. Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *451; CECIL HERBERT
SANSOME PRESTON & GEORGE HAROLD NEWSOM, LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS 241-42 (2d ed.
1943); 1 HORACE G. WOOD, LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS § 1, at 4 (4th ed. 1916)).
149. See id. at 2633.
150. See id. at2620-21.
151. For example, early punitive damage verdicts in asbestos litigation led to the bankruptcy
of as many as eighty-five primary defendants, leaving pennies on the dollar for settlements with
current and future plaintiffs for basic medical expenses. See David C. Landin, Victor E. Scwartz &
Phil Goldberg, Lessons Learned from the Front Lines: A Trial Court Checklist for Promoting
Order and Sound Policy in Asbestos Litigation, 16 BROOK. J.L. & POL'Y 589, 603 (2008) (citing
Quenna Sook Kim, Asbestos Trust Says Assets are Reduced as the Medically Unimpaired File
Claims, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2001, at B6); William P. Shelly et al., The Need for Transparency
Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC.
257, 257 (2008) (citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS
LITIGATION xxvii (2005); MASS TORT SUBCOMM., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF
ASBESTOS CLAIMS AND TRENDS 5 (2007), http://www.actuary.org/pdf/casualty/asbestos
aug07.pdf).
152. For example, in the late 1960s, American courts began to depart from the historical
"intentional tort" underpinnings of punitive damages. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (holding for the first time that punitive damages are
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20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss4/4
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
the common law authority to place an appropriate limit where there is a
demonstrated problem, namely, the outlier verdict. The fact that the Supreme
Court considered alternatives, including a reasoned rejection of verbal
thresholds, provides a framework for use by common law courts who are
seeking the most effective means to stem unpredictable and potentially infinite
punitive damage awards in our state courts before throwing a constitutional red
flag.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S PERSUASIVE AUTHORITY AS A GUIDE FOR STATE
COURTS
If courts and commentators pigeonhole Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker as
relevant only to punitive damage awards in federal maritime cases, then its
impact on the judicial landscape is but a grain of sand on the punitive damages
beach. For example, Westlaw reports only approximately ten maritime cases
each year involving punitive damage awards. 4 The language of the opinion
and the Court's reliance on empirical data stemming from punitive damage
awards in ordinary state common law cases, 155 however, provide the ruling with
potentially far broader applicability, even if only persuasive in authority. The
question, therefore, is whether state courts will follow the guidance offered by
the Supreme Court and adopt a flexible 1:1 ratio as a red flag for excessive
punitive damage verdicts. Alternatively, will state courts post-Exxon simply
continue to apply ineffective verbal thresholds through jury instructions and the
"dance before the jury"' 56 of traditional shocks the conscience and passion and
prejudice tests for excessive awards?
Although Exxon does not have the force of law for state courts, there is a
long history of state courts looking to the United States Supreme Court for
guidance in their own state law decision making. For example, state courts have
changed their interpretation of state rules regarding the admission of expert
evidence in response to Supreme Court rulings directed at federal cases. In
addition, there are many state constitutional concepts such as due process and
state statutes such as antidiscrimination laws that have federal counterparts with
recoverable in a strict products liability action). State courts also allowed lesser conduct such as
recklessness and even gross negligence to provide a foundation for punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Wisker v. Hart, 766 P.2d 168, 173 (Kan. 1988) (gross negligence).
153. See statutes cited supra note 2.
154. A March 11, 2009 Westlaw search of the federal maritime law case database (FMRT-
CS) returned 97 cases over the past decade with the phrase "punitive damages" in the case
summary or digest.
155. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
156. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949).
157. See infra Part IV.A.
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very similar language. State courts frequently consider the guidance of the
Supreme Court in interpreting such laws. t58 Finally, as in Exxon, state courts
have looked to the Supreme Court when deciding what are essentially common
law issues, such as whether there is a claim for medical monitoring absent a
present physical injury. 159 State courts do not always follow the nonbinding
reasoning of the Supreme Court, but they appear to find its reasoning persuasive
more often than not.
A. Following the Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rules of Evidence
A fundamental distinction regarding the jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court exists between when it is operating under its power to interpret
the Constitution of the United States and when it is exercising federal
supervisory power. Traditionally, the Supreme Court exercises supervisory
power to establish and maintain standards of evidence and procedure where
Congress has not specifically required rules.' These decisions are binding on
federal courts,' 6 1 but the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over state162
judicial proceedings absent a constitutional violation. Federal courts have
used their supervisory authority to protect a defendant's basic rights, to deter
illegal conduct, and to protect judicial integrity. 163
158. See infra Part IV.B.
159. See infra Part IV.C.
160. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (holding that the Court has
inherent supervisory power to fashion rules of evidence); see also United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (holding that judges may not use the supervisory power doctrine to reverse
convictions because of prosecutorial misconduct in cases involving harmless error); Rosales-Lopez
v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190 (1981) (citing Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1976))
(asserting supervisory authority to adopt a rule requiring certain questions to be asked on voir
dire); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (acknowledging the judiciary's inherent
power to adopt rules regarding discovery in criminal cases); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
n.29 (1972) (acknowledging supervisory power of a federal court to adopt a rule governing the
time in which cases must be brought); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (asserting
authority to prescribe a rule regulating qualifications for jury service in the absence of
congressional or constitutional authorization).
161. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1996).
162. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (citing Chandler v. Florida, 499 U.S. 560,
570, 582-83 (1981); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)); see also Mu'Min v. Virginia,
500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (recognizing the Court's "authority is limited to enforcing the commands
of the United States Constitution"); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1981) (per curiam)
("Federal judges ... may not require the observance of any special procedures [in state courts]
except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution.").
163. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 505 (citing United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36, 736
n.8 (1980); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214,
217 (1956); McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340).
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In 1993, the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to address
the standard for admission of expert testimony by interpreting the Federal Rules
of Evidence.164 In Daubert the Court broke with seventy years of tradition and
established a new multi-factor-based approach to evaluating the reliability of
proposed expert testimony. 165 In ruling that Congress's adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence in 1975 supplanted the test for admissibility of expert
testimony then in effect in federal courts,' the Court required that expert
testimony be subject to a strong and careful judicial gatekeeper function in order
to protect a fundamental tenant ofjustice: finding the truth.
The Supreme Court instructed that when "[fWaced with a proffer of expert
scientific testimony... the trial judge must determine at the outset ... whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist
the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. ' 6 The Court tasked
district courts with screening proffered expert testimony to ensure that what is
admitted "is not only relevant, but reliable." 169 In determining reliability, the
Court provided a nonexclusive list of key factors for courts to consider before
admitting expert testimony, including (1) whether the "theory or technique can
be (and has been) tested"; (2) whether it "has been subjected to peer review and
publication"; (3) whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high
"known or potential rate of error" and whether there are "standards controlling
the technique's operation"; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys
general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.170 It also required
a determination whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and properly applied to the facts of the case.171
164. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 passim (1993) (interpreting Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Congress amended Rule 702 in 2000 to include Daubert's
holding. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
165. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
166. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, FED. R.
EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586-87.
167. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 597.
168. Id. at 592 (citing FED. R. EVID. 104(a)).
169. Id. at 589.
170. Id. at 593-94. The Rules Advisory Committee, in amending Rule 702 to reflect
Daubert, recognized several additional factors that courts might consider. FED. R. EvID. 702
advisory committee's note. Some courts, such as the Third Circuit, have taken this "Daubert-plus
approach," which encourages courts to consider the Daubert factors as well as the additional
factors the Advisory Committee added, if applicable, in each case. See United States v. Mitchell,
365 F.3d 215, 234 n.14 (3d Cir. 2004) ('The Advisory Committee's note accompanying [the 20001
amendment is a useful consolidation of commentary and precedent... so we will refer to it at
points in our opinion.").
171. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. Two subsequent Supreme Court decisions, General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), further clarified that Daubert requires a fit between the expert's reasoning and conclusions,
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Daubert coincided with the emergence of toxic torts and the burgeoning use
of experts in civil litigation.172 It came after juries in the mid-1980s, adrift in a
sea of conflicting "expert" testimony, rendered multimillion-dollar awards in
cases alleging that the morning sickness drug Bendectin caused birth defects.1
73
Courts ultimately reversed these verdicts on appeal or replaced them with
judgments notwithstanding the verdicts 174 but not before the manufacturer
removed Bendectin from the market in 1983, depriving women of the only Food
and Drug Administration-approved medication that blunted the hard symptoms
of morning sickness. 75 After Daubert, these Bendectin cases were thoroughly
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146-57, and applies to all technical or other specialized expert testimony, not
just scientific evidence, Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149. Together, this trio of cases stands for the
fundamental principle that trial court judges must act as gatekeepers and carefully screen expert
testimony to ensure its reliability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
summarized Rule 702 as "embod[ying] three distinct substantive restrictions on the admission of
expert testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit." Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citing Brown v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.), 35 F.3d
717, 741-43 (3d Cir. 1994)). Effective December 1, 2000, Congress amended the Federal Rules of
Evidence to effectively codify this trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases. See FED. R. EVID. 702
advisory committee's note ("The [2000] amendment affirms the trial court's role as gatekeeper and
provides some general standards that the trial court must use to assess the reliability and
helpfulness of proffered expert testimony.").
172. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in
the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 31 (1993) (citing studies that found a 1500% rise in the
number of experts testifying in Cook County, Illinois between 1974 and 1989 and finding that
experts testified in 86% of all cases, 95% of personal injury cases, and 100% of product liability
cases in a sample of California cases in 1985 and 1986 (citing Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses
and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 669 (1992); Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991
WIs. L. REV. 1113, 1120)).
173. See, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 83-3504, 1987 WL 18743, at *6
(D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1987) (awarding a $95 million verdict), rev'd, 897 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799, 799, 804 (D.D.C. 1986)
(granting defendant manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding a jury award of $1.6
million), aff'd, 857 F.2d 823, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See generally Sanders, supra note 172
(analyzing why juries often are unable to understand scientific evidence and, focusing on trials
involving the drug Bendectin, recommending proposals to facilitate jury verdicts that conform to
the weight of scientific evidence and judicial opinion); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance
Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2171-73 (2000)
(describing juries' "erroneous and inconsistent liability decisions" in cases involving Bendectin,
breast implants, and vaccines).
174. Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1164 (reversing a $95 million verdict); Richardson, 649 F. Supp. at
799, 804 (granting defendant manufacturer's motion for judgment notwithstanding a jury award of
$1.6 million), aff'd, 857 F.2d at 824. Eventually, the manufacturers prevailed on appeal in all
instances but one, Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
See Sanders, supra note 172, at 28-29 & n.139; Stewart, supra note 173, at 2171 & n.19.
175. Barbara Culliton, Merrell Dow Stops Marketing Bendectin, 221 Sci. 37, 37 (1983).
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discredited. 176 Another example is the silicone breast implant litigation that
forced Dow Corning to file Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1995. When scientists
carefully examined the issue and acted as a gatekeeper, juries found no link
between implants and autoimmune disorders, cancer, or any other serious
disease. 177
Although the Supreme Court's ruling does not apply to state courts
interpreting their own rules of evidence, about half of the states have gradually
adopted the essential principles of Daubert, either expressly or by
• ,. • 178
implication. Only fourteen states, but including some of the most populous
176. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 738 (Tex. 1997)
(extensively considering scientific methodology in a Bendectin case to find that the offered
epidemiological studies failed to show a sufficiently increased risk and were not published or
subject to peer review and concluding that offered animal studies did not support causation in
humans). In Daubert itself, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the plaintiffs expert based its theory on animal and test tube studies. Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-73, 575 (S.D. Cal. 1989). No study supported plaintiff's
theory that Bendectin could cause malformations in human fetuses. Id. at 575-76. For these
reasons, the trial court concluded that this theory did not meet the Frye general acceptance test. Id.
The plaintiffs appealed and the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling. See Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court then set forth the
Daubert factors and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with them. Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593-94, 598.
177. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 90-110 (1996) (authored by the executive editor of the
New England Journal of Medicine). See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 192-93 (1991) (praising courts' rejection of arguments that AIDS
can be transmitted by casual contact after experts presented strong evidence contradicting the "junk
science alternative" and stating that "[b]y refusing to take the junk science of AIDS seriously, wise
judges help put a stop to it").
178. See DEF. RESEARCH INST., FRYEIDAUBERT: A STATE REFERENCE GUIDE 3 (2005).
Jurisdictions adopting the principles of Daubert include Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. Some states may apply
Daubert to certain types of expert testimony, such as experts seeking to speak on novel scientific
evidence, but not to other types of evidence. See, e.g., State v. Bowman, 89 P.3d 986, 994 (Mont.
2004) (concluding the district court did not err in not holding a Daubert hearing because the
defendant's expert's association with "a forensic lab that is the only one in the world that works on
a full-time basis with wildlife" did not make the expert's testimony novel science). Not all state
courts that have adopted Daubert apply its factors as stringently as federal courts. See David E.
Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS 351, 358-61
(2004); see also DEF. RESEARCH INST., supra, at 30 ("New Jersey courts are known to be quite
liberal about admitting expert scientific testimony in civil matters."); J.E. Cullens, Jr., A Review of
Recent Daubert Decisions of Louisiana State Courts, 52 LA. B.J. 352, 352 (2005) ("Daubert
gatekeepers in Louisiana state courts seem more like friendly doormen .... ").
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ones, continue to apply the Frye "general acceptance" test, 179 the standard used
by federal courts prior to Daubert.
180
Some state courts adopted Daubert primarily due to the comparable
language between the federal and state rules of evidence or to further
consistency between admissibility of expert evidence in federal and state
courts.18' Others did so based more on the reasoning underlying the Supreme
179. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by statute, FED. R.
EVID. 702, as recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586-87.
180. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-73, 576 (S.D.
Cal. 1989) (using the Frye test to reject proffered expert testimony), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated, 509 U.S. 579, 597-98 (1993). Jurisdictions rejecting Daubert and continuing to
follow the Frye general acceptance test include Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Washington. DEF. RESEARCH
INST., supra note 178, at 3. Other states have adopted their own standards or hybrids of the two
approaches and conform to neither Daubert nor Frye. See Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman,
The Draining of Daubert and the Recidivism of Junk Science in Federal and State Courts, 35
HOFSTRA L. REv. 217, 267 n.302 (2006).
181. See, e.g., M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 522 (Del. 1999)
("Although this Court is not bound by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
comparable federal rules of procedure or evidence, we hereby adopt the holdings of Daubert and
Carmichael as the correct interpretation of Delaware Rule of Evidence 702."); Baker Valley
Lumber, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409,415 (N.H. 2002) ("Although Daubert is binding
only in federal court, the text of New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 is identical to the federal
rule at the time of the Daubert decision."). It is common for state courts to consider federal case
law when interpreting state rules of procedure, particularly since many state rules are modeled after
the federal rules. See, e.g., Mitchell v. H & R Block, Inc., 783 So. 2d 812, 816 (Ala. 2000) (citing
Rowan v. First Bank of Boaz, 476 So. 2d 44, 46 (Ala. 1985)) (finding federal class action decisions
persuasive); Smith v. Washington, 10 S.W.3d 877, 880 (Ark. 2000) (citing Bussey v. Bank of
Malvern, 603 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980)) (finding federal case law on dismissals by
stipulation "to be of significant precedential value"); Weiner v. Kneller, 557 A.2d 1306, 1310
(D.C. 1989) (looking to federal decisions related to exclusion of evidence as a sanction for failure
to provide required discovery); Harada v. Bums, 445 P.2d 376, 380 (Haw. 1968) (finding federal
court interpretation of federal rules of evidence "highly persuasive" in construing Hawaii rules of
procedure); In re Tina T., 579 N.E.2d 48, 55 (Ind. 1991) (citing Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch.
Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 485 n.27 (5th Cir. 1982)) (looking to the federal class certification rule); Sipes
v. Bd. of Mun. & Zoning Appeals, 635 A.2d 86, 94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (finding that in
absence of Maryland authority, federal decisions interpreting rule on intervention are of
"'considerable precedential value' (quoting Md. Radiological Soc'y, Inc. v. Health Servs. Cost
Review Comm'n, 402 A.2d 907, 911 n.5 (Md. 1979))); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 759 So. 2d
1238, 1240 (Miss. 2000) (citing Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 451 So. 2d 219, 221 (Miss. 1984);
McGriggs v. Montgomery, 710 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)) (finding that "[w]hen
considering rules of procedure, Mississippi courts will routinely look to interpretation of the same
federal rule" in evaluating request to set aside judgment); N. Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 542 N.W.2d
725, 727 (N.D. 1996) (giving "'great deference' to federal case law" regarding motions for relief
from judgment (quoting Gruebele v. Gruebele, 338 N.W.2d 805, 811 n.5 (N.D. 1983))); Yahnke v.
Carson, 613 N.W.2d 102, 108-09 (Wis. 2000) (quoting Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543, 1551 (10th
Cir. 1995)) (adopting the "federal 'sham affidavit' rule" as furthering the purposes of summary
judgment procedure).
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Court's decision. For example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut adopted
Daubert because it believed that trial judges should take a more active role in
examining the "validity of the methodologies underlying proffered scientific
evidence.., in determining... admissibility" and that the court was indeed
moving toward this gatekeeping approach in the years preceding the United
States Supreme Court's ruling. 82 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska
followed the high court not because it was required to do so but because it was
"convinced that by shifting the focus to the kind of reasoning required in
science-empirically supported rational explanation-the Daubert/Joineri
Kumho Tire Co. trilogy of cases greatly improves the reliability of the
information upon which verdicts and other legal decisions are based." The
Supreme Court of Nebraska also found, after closely considering the experience
of other states, that Daubert provided "a more effective and just means of
evaluating the admissibility of expert opinion testimony." 184 Likewise, state
courts may find that Exxon offers a more effective and just means of evaluating
whether a punitive damage verdict is excessive than their current common law
standards.
B. Congruent Interpretation of State and Federal Constitutional and
Statutory Provisions
Many state constitutional principles such as due process' 85 and state statutes
such as antidiscrimination laws have federal counterparts with very similar
language. These similarities provide another area where state courts look to the
United States Supreme Court's nonbinding decisions for guidance.
There is a great deal of ongoing scholarly debate as to how state courts
should interpret their state constitutions in light of the federal Constitution.186
182. See State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746-47 (Conn. 1997); see also State v. O'Key, 899
P.2d 663, 680 (Or. 1995) (finding Daubert persuasive and adopting the U.S. Supreme Court's test
after finding the state and federal case law congruent in treating general acceptance as one factor in
the trial court's decision on admissibility and an obligation on the part of trial court judges to act as
gatekeepers).
183. Schafersman v. Agland Coop., 631 N.W.2d 862, 876 (Neb. 2001).
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., State v. Laurent, 744 A.2d 598, 600 (N.H. 1999) (quoting State v. Marti, 732
A.2d 414, 417 (N.H. 1999)) (noting that New Hampshire courts may look to federal due process
decisions for the purpose of aiding their state constitutional analysis).
186. See, e.g., JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005) (arguing that state courts should
independently interpret their state constitutions based on their own state identities and act as agents
of federalism); Thomas R. Bender, For a More Vigorous State Constitutionalism, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 621, 683 (2005) (finding that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not taken
full power to give its state constitution independent vitality and meaning); James A. Gardner & Jim
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As Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. cautioned years ago, rulings of the Supreme
Court "are not mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court
judges and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them." 187
Nevertheless, state courts frequently turn to Supreme Court decisions when
interpreting state constitutional provisions. They do so for two reasons. First,
looking to federal constitutional decisions promotes consistency between state
and federal law. Some state judiciaries closely adhere to a rule interpreting state188
constitutional provisions in harmony with their federal counterparts. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, federal constitutional jurisprudence is quite
extensive when compared to the sparse availability of reported state court
decisions. Although the earliest state constitutions preceded the federal
Constitution by two decades, states have frequently amended and sometimes
wholly replaced their governing document. Moreover, historically, courts,
attorneys, and the American public have largely ignored state constitutions.
1 90
Thus, turning to United States Supreme Court rulings provides state courts with
ready access to over two centuries of scholarly thought and a firm foundation to
serve as a starting point for their decisions.
191
For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, looking to United States
Supreme Court decisions, recently found that a dog sniff that briefly prolonged
Rossi, Foreword: The New Frontier of State Constitutional Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1231
(2005) (providing introduction to symposium on the issue and participant viewpoints); Justin Long,
Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 72-73 (2006) (finding that overall courts
have not taken the aggressive independent approach to interpreting state constitutions many
commentators urge); John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort
Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1196 (2005) (arguing that state courts have improperly used state
constitutional provisions to interfere with experiments in public policy).
187. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 502 (1977) (suggesting that state courts adopt greater protections than the U.S.
Supreme Court for protecting individual rights).
188. See, e.g., State v. Linton, 93 P.3d 183, 185 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State v.
Schoel, 341 P.2d 481, 482 (Wash. 1959)) (interpreting state double jeopardy clause consistently
with federal interpretation); State v. Arias, 752 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Wis. 2008) (citing State v.
Jennings, 647 N.W.2d 142, 151 (Wis. 2002)) ("Generally, we have interpreted provisions of the
Wisconsin Constitution consistent with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of their
counterparts in the federal [Clonstitution.").
189. See Witt, supra note 186, at 1163-64.
190. See id. ("[I]n the late 1980s only one in two Americans even knew their state had a
constitution." (citing John Kincaid, The New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. ST. GOV'T 163, 169
(1988))).
191. See People v. Brumfield, 366 N.E.2d 1130, 1133-34 (Il. 1977) ("In construing
statutes, federal authority should be consulted where there is a lack of Illinois precedent." (citing
Fitzgerald v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 361 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977))). The Illinois Supreme
Court followed federal decisions holding that there is no constitutional right to direct voir dire
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a traffic stop for potential underage drinking was not an unreasonable search or
seizure after the sniff revealed cocaine in the vehicle.' 92 The court not only did
so for the sake of consistency with federal law but also because it found
compelling the policy underlying the high court's decisions. 193 For instance, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court agreed with the United States Supreme Court's
finding that there is a significant public interest in using narcotics sniffing dogs
to prevent the flow of drugs into distribution channels. 94 The Wisconsin court
also looked to extensive Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
find that there was no state constitutional violation where use of the dog was
minimally intrusive, was part of an ongoing traffic stop, and prolonged the stop
for only a few seconds.'
95
Some state courts have cautiously incorporated federal case law into their
own decisions, being careful to note that they follow the federal jurisprudence
only due to the strong persuasiveness of the federal opinion, not because they
are required to do so. For instance, when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the state constitutional standard for determining the ineffective
assistance of counsel is not more protective of a defendant's rights than the
federal constitutional standard, 196 a concurring judge clarified that:
[W]hen this Court in deciding a claim under state law approvingly cites
language from a federal court opinion we do so only because we find
the language helpful or the reasoning persuasive. In adopting the
"reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective
assistance" test .... we in no way bound ourselves to follow future
pronouncements on the subject from the Fifth Circuit or any other
federal court; not when we are interpreting Texas law. It means simply
that we cast about for a "reasonably acceptable definition" of effective
assistance of counsel, and having found one, made it our own. 1
97
Likewise, the Oregon Supreme Court has noted that it is
192. See Arias, 752 N.W.2d at 755-63.
193. Id. at 761 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983)).
194. Id.; see United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
195. See Arias, 752 N.W.2d at 753-63. In its analysis, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited,
inter alia, the following United States Supreme Court cases: Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 404
(2005), Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998), Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1997),
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
196. Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
197. Id. at 61 (Clinton, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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expected that counsel and courts often will refer to federal decisions, or
to commentary based on such decisions, even in debating an undecided
issue under state law. Lest there be any doubt about it, when this court
cites federal opinions in interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does
so because it finds the views there expressed persuasive, not because it
considers itself bound to do so by its understanding of federal
doctrines. 198
The Oregon court ultimately found that when prosecutorial conduct causes a
mistrial, the double jeopardy clause of its state constitution provides broader
protection than the federal standard; however, the court emphasized that the
difference between the federal and Oregon standards is "actually quite
narrow." 1
99
State courts not only look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance
when interpreting their state constitutions but also when interpreting state
statutes that mirror federal law. These decisions generally follow a similar
pattern as the constitutional rulings. In some cases, state courts have followed
the Supreme Court primarily to further consistency between federal and state
law, particularly when the state legislature looked to the federal law as a model
when drafting its own legislation. Federal court decisions are also helpful to
198. State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983) (footnote call number omitted).
199. Id. at 1324. The court held that the Oregon constitution bars a retrial when a
"prosecutor or other responsible official intentionally provokes the defendant to demand a mistrial"
and that a court may find such intent based on "the character and the circumstances of the
prejudicial conduct ... without having to obtain an admission to that effect." Id. at 1325.
200. See, e.g., Kamen v. Lindly, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("Where,
as here, California law is modeled on federal laws, federal decisions interpreting substantially
identical statutes are unusually strong persuasive precedent on construction of our own laws."
(citing Bldg. Material & Constr. Teamsters' Union, Local 216 v. Farrell, 715 P.2d 648, 651 (Cal.
1986) (in bank); Holmes v. McColgan, 110 P.2d 428, 430 (Cal. 1941))); O'Malley v. St. Thomas
Univ., Inc., 599 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (according "great weight" to federal
RICO decisions in interpreting and applying Florida's RICO Act (citing Wilson v. State, 596 So.
2d 775, 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Boyd v. State, 578 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991); State v. Nishi, 521 So. 2d 252, 253-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988))); CTS Corp. v. Coons (In
re CTS Corp.), 428 N.E.2d 794, 798-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (interpreting the Indiana Business
Take-Over Offers Act and relying on federal interpretations of the Williams Act); Bahre v. Pearl,
595 A.2d 1027, 1031 n.5 (Me. 1991) (interpreting terms in the state blue sky laws and looking to
federal case law for "some guidance"); Marx v. Bragalini, 160 N.E.2d 611, 616 (N.Y. 1959)
(noting that in adopting the New York state personal income tax, the state legislature modeled it on
the federal law, and therefore the state policy is to adopt reasonable and practical construction of
those similar terms); N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, Inc., 63 N.E.2d 68, 74
(N.Y. 1945) (giving federal court opinions construing the National Labor Relations Act equal
applicable force to the state act).
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state courts when there is an absence of state precedent on a similar issue.201 But
state courts do not blindly follow federal precedent; they do so when they find
the underlying reasoning of the decision is sound.
For instance, since many state antidiscrimination laws closely resemble
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, federal jurisprudence provides a
useful guide to state courts. State courts have looked to Supreme Court
reasoning to help them resolve various civil rights issues such as the burden of
proof in racial discrimination, 202 disparate treatment, and hostile work
environment claims 2° 3 as well as the running of the statute of limitations for an
employment discrimination claim under state law. 204 In the area of employment
discrimination as well as other areas, some state courts have followed federal
precedent "[u]nless there is a good reason for deviating from the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation." 205 State courts may also look to federal
201. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Chi. Title & Trust Co., 361 N.E.2d 94, 96 (I11. App. Ct. 1977)
(considering interpretation of the Federal Trade Commission Act to determine the existence of an
unfair or deceptive trade practice under state law).
202. See Baldwin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 961 So. 2d 418, 422 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Hicks v. Cent. La. Elec. Co., 712 So. 2d 656, 658 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (considering federal
interpretations of racial antidiscrimination laws regarding burden of proof).
203. See White v. Rainbo Baking Co., 765 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) ('United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding the federal provision are most persuasive, if not
controlling, in interpreting the Kentucky statute."' (quoting Ky. Comm'n on Human Rights v.
Commonwealth, 586 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979))).
204. See Gusciara v. Lustig, 806 N.E.2d 746, 751-52 (111. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117-18 (2002)). Morgan ruled that a hostile working
environment claim is timely so long as a single unlawful employment practice that has some
relation to the earlier acts falls within the 180-day period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117-18. The
Illinois Court of Appeals followed the federal decision because it was "confident that Morgan's
holding will discourage potential claimants from undue delay in filing charges." Gusciaria, 806
N.E.2d at 752. See also Faulkner-King v. Dep't of Human Rights, 587 N.E.2d 599, 602-03 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 255-61 (1980)) (finding statute of
limitations began to run as of date of notice of termination in accordance with federal precedent);
Weber v. Moses, 938 S.W.2d 387, 390-93 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6,
7-9 (1981); Ricks, 499 U.S. at 257-58, 261)) (determining running of statute of limitations for
retaliatory discharge based on federal case law). In another case, however, Vollemans v. Town of
Wallingford, 928 A.2d 586 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007), a Connecticut appellate court opted not to
follow Ricks or Chardon, holding that the period for filing a discriminatory discharge complaint
accrues when the employer unequivocally notifies the employee of termination rather than at the
date of termination. Id. at 602, 605. It did so after a careful analysis of Connecticut's policy
preference of deciding cases on the merits whenever possible and because it found unsound and
unpersuasive the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ricks and Chardon. See id. at 593-605.
As the court recognized, "federal law defines the beginning and not the end of our approach to the
subject." Id. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Comm'n on Human Rights
& Opportunities, 559 A.2d 1120, 1124 (Conn. 1989)).
205. State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Ariz. 1980) (in banc) (discussing securities
statutes); see also Gusciara, 806 N.E.2d at 751-52 (finding that the court would opt not to follow
federal precedent only if there was a compelling reason to adopt a contrary interpretation).
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precedent and opinions of the Federal Trade Commission in determining
whether an act is unfair or deceptive under their consumer protection laws.
206
While the federal precedent to which they look for guidance clearly does
not bind state courts in interpreting their state constitutions and statutes, the ease
in and advantages of doing so, at least as a starting point, have made it a routine
practice among most states. Its federal maritime basis notwithstanding, the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Exxon provides another tool in the kit
of state courts for gauging whether a punitive damage award is excessive as a
matter of state common law.
C. The Influence of the Supreme Court on the Development of State
Common Law
Nonbinding Supreme Court decisions have also had a significant impact on
several areas of state common law. For example, in 1997, the Supreme Court
considered a question that has taken center stage in state courts dealing with
massive actions stemming from situations where plaintiffs believe they were
exposed to a toxic substance but have not shown any physical symptoms or
other evidence of illness or disease. In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v.
Buckley, 207 the Supreme Court faced this issue under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), a law that addresses claims by workers who are injured
while acting in the course of employment on interstate railroads. 21 Although
the Court was interpreting a federal statute, it essentially was making a common
law determination, namely whether an asymptomatic pipefitter could bring a
claim against his employer for negligent infliction of emotional distress or
medical monitoring for occupational exposure to asbestos. 209 In a case that
influenced many state courts that later addressed the issue from a common law
210standpoint, the Court ruled 7-2 against such claims.
The Supreme Court concluded that a worker "cannot recover unless, and
until, he manifests symptoms of a disease."' 21 1 The Court carefully considered
the policy concerns militating against adoption of a medical monitoring cause of
206. See, e.g., People v. All Am. Aluminum & Constr. Co., 524 N.E.2d 1067, 1071-72 (I11.
App. Ct. 1988) (citing Fitzgerald, 361 N.E.2d at 96) (applying Federal Trade Commission
standards).
207. 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
208. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000).
209. See Buckley, 512 U.S. at 437-38, 442-44 ("[I]f the common law concludes that a legal
rule permitting recovery here, from a tort law perspective, and despite benefits in some individual
cases, would on balance cause more harm than good, and if we find that judgment reasonable, we
cannot find that conclusion inconsistent with the FELA's humanitarian purpose.").
210. Id.
211. Id. at 427.
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action, including the difficulty in identifying which medical monitoring costs
are over and above the preventative medicine ordinarily recommended for
everyone, conflicting testimony from medical professionals as to the benefit and
appropriate timing of particular tests or treatments, and each plaintiffs unique
medical needs. 2 12 The Court noted that the suffering of "tens of millions of
individuals ... might justify some form of substance-exposure-related medical
monitoring." 213 The Court, however, rejected the argument that medical
monitoring awards are not costly and feared that allowing medical monitoring
claims could create double recoveries because alternative, collateral sources of
monitoring are often available, such as through employer-provided health
insurance plans.
2 14
The Buckley opinion has been highly influential on state courts. In
accordance with Buckley, traditional principles of tort law, and sound public
policy, most state courts of last resort recently presented with the issue have
rejected medical monitoring. Since 1999, seven of the eight state high courts
addressing the issue have expressly rejected medical monitoring absent a
showing of a present physical injury, including the high courts of Alabama,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oregon.
215
Although state supreme courts did not have to follow the United States
Supreme Court's decision, Buckley was central to many of these rulings. For
example, before reaching its decision, the Alabama Supreme Court recounted
the arguments and counterarguments for recognizing a medical monitoring
216claim which Buckley closely examined. Similarly, the Michigan Supreme
212. Id. at441-42.
213. Id. at 442.
214. See id. at 442-43 ("[W]here state and federal regulations already provide the relief that
a [medical monitoring] plaintiff seeks, creating a full-blown tort remedy could entail systemic
costs without corresponding benefits" because the remedy would allow recovery "irrespective of
the presence of a 'collateral source' of payment.").
215. See Hinton ex rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827, 831-32 (Ala. 2001); Wood
v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 82 S.W.3d 849, 859 (Ky. 2002); Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d
684, 701 (Mich. 2005); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 7 (Miss. 2007);
Badillo v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001); Sinclair v. Merck & Co., 948 A.2d
587, 595 (N.J. 2008); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 183 P.3d 181, 187 (Or. 2008). For
examples of a few courts reaching contrary outcomes, see Meyer ex rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp., 220
S.W.3d 712, 717 (Mo. 2007) (en banc); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 434
(W. Va. 1999); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., 716 So. 2d 355, 360 (La. 1998). See also
Mark A. Behrens & Christopher E. Appel, Medical Monitoring in Missouri After Meyer ex rel.
Coplin v. Fluor Corp.: Sound Policy Should be Restored to a Vague and Unsound Directive, 27 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 135 (2007) (exploring the implications of the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision and suggesting solutions for lower courts).
216. Hinton, 813 So. 2d at 830-32 (quoting Buckley, 521 U.S. 441-43).
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Court "share[d] the concerns raised by the United States Supreme Court in
Buckley" that judicial adoption of medical monitoring
may do more harm than good-not only for Michigan's economy but
also for "other potential plaintiffs who are not before the court and who
depend on a tort system that can distinguish between reliable and
serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial
claims on the other."
'2 17
Likewise, the Mississippi Supreme Court noted the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning that "to recognize medical monitoring costs alone as a
separate injury is to go 'beyond the bounds of currently evolving common
law.' 218 "Accordingly," the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded, "as
plaintiffs invite this Court to recognize a medical monitoring cause of action, an
act which would require an unprecedented and unfounded departure from the
long-standing traditional elements of a tort action, this Court declines that
invitation."
2
These courts could have classified Buckley as a FELA case, but as the
Supreme Court of Kentucky observed, "the [United States Supreme] Court was
clearly speaking to the more general issue of medical monitoring" when it
discussed the "unlimited and unpredictable liability" associated with permitting
claims based on mere exposure. As state courts consider the Supreme Court's
latest decision providing an empirical means of addressing outlier punitive
damages, they should similarly view it not as a maritime case but as sound
reasoning that can assist courts to develop a common law jurisprudence that can
further a more predictable civil justice system.
V. CONCLUSION
In informal discussions with state court judges, the authors have learned an
interesting fact. A number of state supreme court justices strongly object to the
United States Supreme Court's utilization of the Constitution to place
substantive due process limits on punitive damages. Even some liberal judges
suggest that they agree with Justices Scalia and Thomas on this specific issue.
More basically, they view themselves as common law judges, and they resent
such intrusions. On the other hand, state judges have been quite receptive to
217. Henry, 701 N.W.2d at 696 (quoting Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443-44).
218 Paz, 949 So. 2d at 6 (quoting Buckley, 521 U.S. at 439).
219. Id.
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well-reasoned decisions by the Supreme Court when it is exercising its federal
supervisory power to interpret rules of procedure or evidence, interpreting
constitutional provisions or federal statutes that have a state equivalent, or
deciding common law concepts in a federal statutory context. In such instances,
when the high court acts from the judges' perspective as just another state court
and renders decisions that have sound reason and cogent arguments behind
them, state justices are often willing to follow.
As this Article has shown, the opinion of Justice Souter in Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker is carefully crafted to address an ongoing, unsolved problem: the
"outlier" punitive damage award. Justice Souter carefully considered alternative
approaches, utilized existing data, and openly and carefully explained his
reasoning for adopting a 1:1 ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages. The decision has the power and substance of other United States
Supreme Court supervisory decisions that state courts have embraced and may
prove highly influential in state courts. For reasons expressed in this Article, we
suggest that it be a welcome resource for state common law courts in their
attempt to place meaningful limits on outlier punitive damage awards.
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